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Abstract 
The allowance mechanism is one of the core and sensitive aspects in design of a carbon trading scheme and affects 
the compliance cost for each company covered under the scheme. By examining China’s allowance mechanism 
from two aspects including allowance allocation and allowance distribution, this paper compares China’s carbon 
trading pilots with the EU Emissions Trading System and California Cap-and-Trade Program, and through the 
comparison identify issues that affect the efficiency of the pilots. The paper also recommends course of actions to 
strengthen China’s existing pilots and build valuable experiences for the establishment of the national 
cap-and-trade system in China.  
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1. Introduction 
Due to its rapid economic expansion over the last decade, China has become the world's largest 
energy consumer and greenhouse gases (GHGs) emitter. With growing resources and environmental 
constrains domestically and the need for meeting international commitment to GHGs abatement, 
China's National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)launched a series of local carbon 
cap-and-trade pilots in seven provinces and cities including Shenzhen, Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, 
Chongqing, Guangdong, and Hubei[1], each of which has started its operation between 2013 and 2014. 
The design of Chinese carbon trading pilots (CTPs) has become the focus of many researchers. Han 
et al [2] and Lo [3] are the early researchers to study the preparation of the pilots and argued that there 
would be tremendous challenge and influence on the theory and practices of the emissions trading. 
Zhang et al. conducted an overall assessment of China's seven CTPs [4], while several other researchers 
such as Jiang et al.[5],Wu et al.[6] and Qi et al.[7], examined some specific aspects of these pilots 
including their institutional structures and design features. Shen et al.[8] conducted a comprehensive 
analysis in which they compared China’s CTPs with the California Cap-and-Trade Program (CA CAT) 
in multiple aspects. In spite of some discussion on the allowance mechanism in China’s CTPs, however, 
none of the existing researches have focused on the details of the allowance design in China’s pilots. As 
one of the core components in a carbon trading scheme, allowance mechanism affects the abatement 
responsibility and compliance cost of each covered entity and is always the most sensitive topic that 
draws a great deal of attention from the research community and policy makers. Therefore, it is 
important to conduct a comprehensive and in-depth analysis on the allowance mechanism in China’s 
CTPs.
In this paper, we examines the allowance mechanism of China’s pilots from two aspects, one is the 
allowance allocation, and the other is the allowance distribution and make comparisons in the two 
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aspects with EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) and CA CAT. Allocation determines how the 
carbon emission cap on the total number of emission allowances is set and how emission allowances 
are allocated among covered entities within the cap. Allowance distribution deals with distribution of 
allocated allowances to all covered entities as well as dynamic allowance management in 
post-distribution.  
2. Allowance allocation in China’s pilots
2.1 comparative analysis on emission cap and structure of allowances 
The EU ETS has created decreasing emissions caps over its three phases. From the first (2005-2007) 
to the second phase (2008-2012), the cap declines from 2,181 million to 2,083 million allowances per 
year [9]. In the phase 3 (2013-2020), this cap decreases each year by 1.74% of the average total 
quantity of allowances issued annually in 2008-2012 to 1,720 million allowances in 2020 [10].In the 
EU ETS structure, allowances are divided into two parts, one for the existing facilities and the other is 
reserved for new capacities. 
Similar to the EU ETS, CA CAT has also created a declining carbon emissions caps for the covered 
entities, which is set at about2% below the emission level for previous year in the initial compliance 
period (2012-2014)and at 3% annually for the second (2015-2017) and third (2018-2020) compliance 
periods[11]. In three separate compliance periods in the CA CAT, the total allowance cap is set at 488 
million, 1,147million, and 1,039 million allowances, respectively [12].Drawing a lesson from EU 
ETS, the CA CAT reserves a certain number of allowances to create the allowance price containment 
reserve to ensure that the auction prices for allowances are kept in an acceptable range. Figure 1 
displays the declining caps in both EU ETS and CA CAT. 
In China’s carbon trading pilots (CTPs), caps and allowance structures are different due largely to 
the difference in the economic structures of these pilots. As shown in figure 2, the local emission cap 
ranges from the lowest 33 million in Shenzhen to the highest 388 million in Guangdong in 2013. 
However, the number of covered entities in Shenzhen is much higher than Guangdong. This divergence 
reflects the significant difference of industrial structure between them, in which Shenzhen’s economy is 
largely centered on the tertiary industry while the economy in Guangdong concentrates on the heavy 
industry that emits large amount of carbon emissions. Over the common pilot period (2013-2015), caps 
in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Shenzhen pilots will remain unchanged while Guangdong and Hubei 
will increase the cap to cover increasing production of their industrial enterprises and Chongqing will 
decrease the cap by 4.13% per year. Figure 2 shows the caps and number of covered entities in China 
CTPs.
In a developing economy like China, CTPs are designed differently than the EU ETS and CA CAT 
and have taken into the consideration of the local needs for economic expansion and industrialization. 
As a result, Beijing, Shenzhen, Guangdong, and Hubei have divided their allowances into three parts 
including the quotas for the existing facilities, for production expansion, and for possible adjustment, 
respectively, and Shanghai and Tianjin have allocated allowances separately to existing facilities and 
new production. Only in Chongqing, all allowances are allocated to existing facilities because of no 
consideration of new production. 
Source: Ellerman et al.(2010), EC(2009,2012), 
CARB (2010,2011). 
Figure1. The declining caps of EU ETS & 
CA CAT 
Source: China’s ETS pilots management rules and allocation plans. 
Figure 2. The caps and covered entities of China’s CTPs in 
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2.2 comparative analysis on allowances allocation methods 
In the initial implementation of EU ETS, allowances allocation was mainly based on a grandfather 
approach focusing on historical emissions for existing facilities due to data availability and political 
feasibility. In pace with the development of the trading scheme and accumulation of emissions data, 
however, EU ETS has switched its allocation method to using benchmarks in the third phase and 
established a benchmarking system that includes 52 types of product benchmarks and various 
benchmarks for fuels, heat and production processes. The allowances allocated to each covered entity 
are determined by four factors: product benchmark, historical production, carbon leakage factor, and 
cap adjustment factor. If there is no corresponding product benchmark available, then the fallback 
methodology will be used as an alternative option[13]. 
In CA CAT, allowances allocation utilizes the benchmarking approach that has created a 
benchmark system consists of 28 different types of product and three fallback benchmark value [12]. 
Unlike EU ETS, the fall back method in CA CAT is based on the energy (electricity, fuel and heat) 
rather than the production processes. For the covered facilities under CA CAT, the number of 
allowances are allocated by the following factors: benchmark, three-year moving average output, 
industrial leakage factor, and cap decline factor. 
Table 1.  Comparison of allocation methods in China CTPs, EU ETS and CA CAT 
 
Region 
Historical emissions Historical intensity Benchmarking 
Coverage Allocation 
formula
Coverage Allocation 
formula
Coverage Allocation formula 
BEI  
JING 
existing facilities of 
manufacturing, other 
industrial and service 
sectors 
historical average 
emissions ×decline 
coefficient 
existing 
facilities in 
electricity 
and heat  
historical average 
carbon intensity × 
power (or heat) supply 
× decline coefficient 
new production of 
the covered 
industries  
Industrial benchmark × 
output  
SHANG 
HAI 
industrial sectors other 
than electricity; shopping 
malls, hotels, commercial 
buildings, and railway 
station 
historical emissions 
base + early 
abatement incentives 
none none electricity,   
aviation, airport and 
port sectors 
Industrial benchmark 
×generated electricity 
×load correction factor; 
Industrial benchmark 
×business volume+ early 
abatement incentives  
TIAN  
JIN 
existing facilities of iron 
&steel, chemical, 
petrochemical, oil and 
gas extraction  
historical emissions 
base × performance 
coefficient × 
industrial emission 
control factor 
existing 
facilities in 
electricity 
and heat 
historical average 
carbon emissions of 
per unit power (or 
heat) × power supply 
(or heat) 
new production of 
the covered 
industries 
Industrial benchmark × 
output 
CHONG 
QING 
Aluminum, metal alloys, 
calcium carbide, cement, 
steel, caustic soda 
the highest of  
historical annual 
emissions 
none none none none 
SHEN 
ZHEN 
none none none none electricity, water, 
gas, construction 
and manufacturing 
Industrial benchmark × 
output 
GUANG 
DONG 
cogeneration, cement 
mining and other grinding 
processes, petrochemical,  
short process steel  
historical average 
emissions ×decline 
coefficient 
none none pure power 
generation, cement 
clinker production  
and grinding 
process, long 
process steel  
benchmark × historical 
average output × decline 
coefficient 
HU  
BEI 
pre-allocated quota of 
power enterprises; 
industrial enterprises  
historical emissions 
base × cap adjustment 
factor 
none none Ex-post adjustment 
quotas of electricity 
producers 
Industrial benchmark × 
excess or shortage of 
generated electricity 
EU ETS 
Phase1& 
Phase2 
power, petrochemical, 
iron and steel, building 
materials, paper, aviation 
historical average 
emissions 
none none new production of 
the covered 
industries 
Product benchmark× 
production capacity 
EU ETS 
Phase3 
none none none none electricity, paper, 
petrochemical, iron 
and steel, building 
materials,
chemicals, aviation, 
aluminum 
Product benchmark× 
median of historical 
production× 
carbon leakage factor 
×cap adjustment factor 
CA CAT none none none none electricity, oil 
refining, oil and gas, 
glass, food 
processing, cement 
transportation 
Product benchmark × 
three-year moving 
average output × 
industrial leakage factor 
× cap decline factor 
Source: Ecofys (2009), EC(2012), CARB (2010,2011), and China’s ETS pilots management rules and allocation plans. 
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Due to short preparation and the lack of adequate emissions data, China’s CTPs mostly use 
historical emissions and intensity with limited benchmarking in allocating allowances. The use of a 
combined approach is aimed at coordinating the dynamic relationships between economic growth, 
industrial transition and emissions control. As shown in Table 1, Beijing and Tianjin use a combination 
of historical emissions, carbon intensity, and industrial benchmark. Shanghai considers of historical 
emissions and industrial benchmark along with early abatement incentives and rolling baseline year. 
Guangdong and Hubei mixes the historical emissions with rolling baseline year and for certain 
industries industrial benchmark Shenzhen and Chongqing have taken different approaches. For 
example, with a large number of covered entities, Shenzhen employs a competitive game theory 
method to allocate free allowances to manufacturing enterprises while Chongqing takes an approach of 
issuing the permits in accordance with the emissions reported by the covered entities themselves with 
total number of permits shrinking by 4.13 percent per year through 2015. 
3. Allowance distribution in China’s pilots
3.1 comparative analysis on allowances distribution patterns 
In EU ETS, the allowances are distributed to covered entities mainly through free distribution and 
competitive auction. In its initial phases, in order to attract and encourage enterprises to actively 
participate in the trading system, the EU mainly used free distribution which, accounted for over 95% 
of total allowances, while the proportion of competitive auction was below 5% [9].From the third phase, 
the European Commission made a provision to auction at least 50% of the total permits in sectors other 
than the energy industry in which permits were obtained 100 percent through auction in 2013[14]. 
In CA CAT, the allowance distribution includes free distribution, competitive auction, and fixed 
price sale. For most industrial facilities, they can receive free allowances in the initial stage, but the 
proportion of the subsequent free allowances will vary across difference industries depending upon the 
degree of carbon leakage risk in different sectors. For example, high-risk industries will receive 100% 
free allowances in all three compliance periods while the middle-risk and low-risk sectors will receive 
descending number of free allowances [12], as shown in Table 2. 
In order to establish the initial carbon market and attract enterprises to actively participate in trading, 
China's CTPs have taken a more realistic approach which uses free distribution with auction and fixed 
price sale as supplementary measures as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2.Distribution patterns of allowances in China’s pilots, EU ETS and CA ETS 
Distribution
Patterns
China’s CTPs EU ETS CA CAT
BJ SH TJ SZ CQ GD HB Phase 
1
Phase 
2
Phase 
3
Phase
1
Phase
2
Phase
3
Free
distribution
൒ 
95%
 
100%
 
100%
൑ 
95%
 
100%
൑ 
97%
൒ 
90%
൒ 
95%
൒ 
90%
 
50%
H:100%
M:100%
L:100%
H:100%
M:75%
L:50%
H:100%
M:50%
L:30%
Competitive 
auction
< 
5%
 
0%
 
0%
൒ 
3%
 
0%
൒ 
3%
 
3%
 
5%
 
10%
൒ 
50%
H:0%
M:0%
L:0%
H:0%
M:25%
L:50%
H:0%
M:50%
L:70%
Fixed price 
sale
< 
5%
 
0%
 
0%
൒ 
2%
 
0%
 
0%
< 
7%
 
0%
 
0%
 
0%
 
1%
 
4%
 
7%
Note: ‘H’ represents the high risk of carbon leakage, ‘M’ represents the middle risk leakage, ‘L’ represents the low risk leakage.
Source: Ecofys(2009), EC(2012), CARB (2010,2011), and China’s ETS pilots management rules and allocation plans. 
3.2 comparative analysis on dynamic management of allowances 
Compared with China where the economy is experiencing fast change, growth in EU and the U.S. is 
more flat. With less change in economic output and more reliable emissions data in EU and California, 
EU ETS and CA CAT can make more accurate determination on allowances. In China’s CTPs, 
however, large discrepancy between pre-allocated allowances and enterprise actual emissions occurs 
due to China’s high growth and incomplete business and emissions information. Therefore, 
policymaker tend to take measures to prevent enterprises from having a serious shortage or excess of 
allowances. 
China’s CTPs have thus designed a unique mechanism which uses an ex-post dynamic adjustment. 
For example, in Hubei pilot, if an enterprise’s actual emissions increases or decreases by 20% from the 
allocated allowances, the government will add or take back the difference between the actual and the 
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upper or lower 20% of pre-allocated allowances. Similarly, Chongqing also designs the ex-post 
adjustment measures, but the range of up or down adjustment is limited to 8%. In other pilots, Beijing, 
Tianjin, Shanghai, and Shenzhen have also included relevant language concerning ex-post adjustment 
in their trading pilot management regulation, but not provided specific adjustment ranges. 
4. Issues with China’s CTPs and Recommendations for Solution 
There are issues in the design of the allowance mechanism in China’s CTPs due to limited 
preparation and lack of reliable business information and emissions data. First,  
the cap that was established during the fast economic growth periods of past Five-Year Plan will be 
mostly like looser than the current reality under the economic ‘new normal’ in which lower economic 
growth becomes a routine phenomenon. It is important for China’s CTPs to make necessary adjustment 
to reflect the change of carbon emissions and avoid allocating excessive allowances like EU ETS did in 
its initial phases. 
Second, free allocation based on grandfathering will create the unintended consequence of 
"whipping the fast ox" penalizing the entities that take actions on abating the climate change. Except for 
Shanghai and Tianjin, China’s current CTPs mostly use historical emissions without crediting 
businesses for taking initiative to reduce carbon emissions. To make the allocation more effectively and 
fairly for achieving optimal reduction of carbon emissions, China needs to transit its allocation scheme 
from the grandfathering rule to the benchmarking approach that more accurately reflects the actual 
emissions and to award credits for businesses that have taken early abatement actions.  
Third, for China’s CTPs, double-counting is an outstanding issue in the allowance allocation. For 
example, all CTPs require both consumers and producers of electricity power to get allowances for the 
power they have consumed or produced. The double-counting of emissions will result in over-supply of 
allowances, creating negative impacts on the emissions trading scheme [15]. It is important for China to 
address the issue by assigning the responsibility to the sources of pollution. 
Fourth, China’s CTPs have employed some benchmarking measures for allowances but in a quite 
limited scale and for very few sectors. The benchmarking approach requires extra effort in collecting 
detailed information on products and technologies; yet it is a better method than the grandfather 
approach which relies predominantly upon historical emissions. To improve the effectiveness of its 
carbon trading scheme, China needs to consider of changing the allocation method from the grandfather 
to benchmarking. This change, however, needs to be supported by sufficient product and business 
performance data.  
Furthermore, the majority of allowances in China’s CTPs is currently free with very small 
percentage (3%-5%) of total allowances being auctioned. In spite of its importance to reduce the 
compliance cost of covered entities in the initial phase of a carbon trading scheme, the free allocation 
reduces the carbon efficiency of China’s CTPs, resulting in less carbon reduction and/or lead to higher 
abatement cost resulting from lack of motivation to innovate. Also, the free allocation cannot provides 
an effective mean for governments to get necessary revenue to support government and community 
programs in reducing carbon emissions. It is therefore important for China CTPs to start shifting from 
free allocation to auctioning of allowances at least for leakage-prone industries or certain sectors that 
are characterized as overcapacity. 
Finally, China’s CTPs have made little effort in releasing important information such as what and 
how various factors are used to determine the allowances. This type of information is important as it 
helps covered entities understand the effort they need to make to reduce their emissions and enables 
researchers to identify potential flaws in the design. It will be in China’s benefit to create clarity and 
strengthen transparency in the design of its CTPs’ allowance allocation. 
5. Conclusion 
After two years of preparations, China’s seven CTPs have officially started in 2013 and 2014 and 
covered entities in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangdong and Shenzhen have completed their first 
compliance year. Due to unique situation in China, its CTPs have some unique features, including a 
specific cap combined with flexible structure, an allowances allocation rule based on historical 
emissions combined with some benchmarking, free allowance distribution arrangement combined with 
some level of auction, and pre-determined quotas combined with ex-post allowance adjustment. 
There are also some particular issues related to China’s CTPs. The issues regarding the design of 
the allowance mechanism in China’s CTPs include over-supply of allowances, lack of allowances 
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credits for businesses that take early abatement actions, double counting on allowances, heavy reliance 
on historical emissions, and lack of the clarity and transparency. China is considering of establishing a 
national carbon trading market. In order to develop a robust and effective a national level carbon 
trading scheme in China, it is critical for the country to thoroughly assess the problems that have been 
discovered in the seven CTPs and carefully identify ways to address these issues. 
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